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Introduction
Political and security relations among the member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have
seldom been free from contentious bilateral problems.  Yet one of the most important features of the intra-ASEAN strategic
environment in recent years has been a rapid expansion of bilateral defence and security ties between ASEAN members.
Evolving from simple intelligence exchanges on border insurgencies, such ties have now come to feature, among other things,
joint operations against insurgents on common borders, regular contacts and intelligence exchanges between high-level
military and security officials, joint contingency planning for mutual assistance against external threats, exchanges of senior
level officers for training, provision of field training facilities, joint maritime surveillance and patrols, cooperative arms
transfers, and a range of military exercises to develop common operating procedures and simulate joint action against common
threats. 
Indeed, such bilateral security and defence ties have evolved to a point where they now affect the fundamental objectives and
role of ASEAN as a regional group.  Against this backdrop, the purpose of this paper is to undertake three tasks relating to the
nature and implications of bilateral defence and security cooperation within ASEAN.  The first is to analyse the evolution of
ASEAN states' attitudes towards security cooperation with a view to explaining why they have so far preferred bilateralism
over alliance.  The second is to provide an overview of the nature, scope and patterns of existing bilateral defence and security
ties within ASEAN.  The third is to analyse the constraints on, and prospects for, ASEAN military cooperation in the light of
some of the recent developments in the regional political and security milieu of Southeast Asia and Asia-Pacific. 
Two major developments have rendered the issue of intra-ASEAN military cooperation increasingly important to any serious
evaluation of the current and future direction of the regional grouping.  The first, as mentioned earlier, is the sheer
proliferation of bilateral military links among the member states.  With the exception of Malaysia and the Philippines (which
are still locked in a dispute over the latter's claim to Sabah), all the other ASEAN states have developed some form of bilateral
military ties with one another.  Indeed, military links underscore the changing context of some of the most difficult political
relationships within ASEAN.  Last year saw the initiation of the first ever bilateral army exercises between Singapore and
Malaysia and Singapore and Indonesia, which, coupled with Indonesia's readiness to offer air force and army training facilities
to Singapore, are indicative of the transformation of Singapore's delicate security position vis-à-vis its Malay neighbours.
These ties, along with intensifying cooperation between Malaysia and Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, Philippines and
Indonesia, Brunei and Singapore, Singapore and Thailand, and Thailand and Indonesia, suggest the emergence of what
Indonesia's armed forces commander, General Try Sutrisno, has aptly referred to as a `defence spider web' in ASEAN.1
Judging from their scope and regularity, bilateral security and defence interaction between its member states is no longer
peripheral to ASEAN's image and identity as a regional grouping; indeed, as Donald Weatherbee has contended, such ties can
no longer be simply dismissed `as not [being] functionally part of the ASEAN political community.'2 
The second, and perhaps a more remarkable trend in intra-ASEAN security relations in recent years is the willingness of ASEAN
leaders to `think the unthinkable': a multilateral ASEAN security framework.  At least judging by publicly aired views, the
notion of an ASEAN security framework (as opposed to a military pact) is no longer the taboo subject it was not so long ago.
The foreign minister of Malaysia, Abu Hassan Omar, has gone as far as to suggest the creation of an `ASEAN Defence
Community' which would `take the ASEAN states to new heights of political and military cooperation.'3 Singapore has
expressed the hope, in the words of its top military officer, Winston Choo, that ` firm and strong bilateral ties will provide the
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foundation for multilateral cooperation.'4 In August 1989, the former foreign minister of Indonesia, Mochtar Kusumaatmatdja,
made a similar call for an ASEAN military arrangement5.  Even the Philippines, which has always been the odd man out in
terms of intra-ASEAN security relations, is taking the view, as articulated by Defence Secretary Fidel Ramos, that `Defence
cooperation is a must in ASEAN.'6 Although many of such suggestions to strengthen ASEAN security relations remain ill-
defined, the very fact that such views are being voiced in public is no small breakthrough.  It represents a major shift from
the past when any mention of military cooperation by one member was sure to prompt firm disavowals from others.  This
time the message from Messrs Mochtar, Ramos and Abu Hassan have found few dissenters from the ranks of senior
politicians and officials in ASEAN states. 
The question of whether a military/security arrangement binding the ASEAN states, if it is to take place, should be constructed
within or outside the formal framework of ASEAN itself remains an open and thorny issue.  But the issue itself has received
little systematic treatment in the literature on Southeast Asian regional security.  This is largely due to two factors: a general
unwillingness among policymakers in the ASEAN states to release information on military matters in the name of national
security, and second, the political sensitivity surrounding the specific subject of intra-ASEAN military links.  As a result,
debates on ASEAN security and defence cooperation have been marred by a paucity of reliable information.  This paper, based
on extensive primary research, is intended to fill the information gap and facilitate efforts by scholars towards more
conceptual generalizations on the subject.
Evolution of Bilateralism
The political and security role of ASEAN has evolved through three major challenges.  The first was the US withdrawal from
Indochina and the communist takeover of South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.  These developments provided the impetus
to the first ASEAN summit at Bali, which in turn gave ASEAN's latent security objectives their most serious public expression.
The second challenge, the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in December 1978, gave a more substantive meaning to political
and security cooperation, one of its salient dimensions being pledges of support to Thailand made by its ASEAN partners in
the event of aggression against ASEAN's ` frontline' state.  Although less important than the previous two, the increasing Soviet
strategic links with Vietnam, including its presence in the South China Sea and Cam Ranh Bay, provided the backdrop to a
third potential turning point in the evolution of ASEAN's security concerns.  This development prompted calls for new levels
of security cooperation, especially the advocacy by Singapore's Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, of multilateral military
exercises among the ASEAN states. 
Each of the three challenges has led to a review of ASEAN's political character and prompted ideas and notions, both general
and specific, to step up security cooperation within ASEAN.  Each has constituted a challenge to the framework of bilateralism
which had been the mode of intra-ASEAN security and military cooperation since (in some cases prior to) the formation of
the regional grouping.  Therefore, an analysis of their impact on the  ASEAN states' security concerns is an appropriate starting
point for identifying the considerations which have kept intra-ASEAN security cooperation bilateral to this date.
Prior to the Bali Summit, ASEAN's vision of regional order in Southeast Asia was influenced by an ` inward-looking' concept
of security, a concept which recognized the primacy of domestic development and stability as the key to regional peace and
security, and stressed the role of ASEAN as a vehicle for economic cooperation and development which would eliminate the
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sources of popular discontent.  In the literature on international relations, the origin of alliances is usually attributed to
commonly perceived external military threats by its membership.  In the case of the ASEAN states, the security concerns of
their leadership converged not on any threat of external aggression, but on the problems of domestic insurgency and
subversion.  ASEAN leaders recognized the futility of countering such threats through a military alliance.  If there was an
`ASEAN view of security,' colouring the attitude of its members towards security cooperation, then it was best described in
terms of the concept of national resilience promoted by Indonesia's New Order leadership.  `Resilience' denoted an `inward
looking concept of security, based on the proposition that national security lies not in military alliances or under the military
umbrella of any great power, but in self-reliance deriving from domestic factors such as economic and social development,
political stability and a sense of nationalism.'7
The rejection of an alliance option by the ASEAN states was also shaped by their avowed commitment to promote regional
autonomy from great power competition and intervention.  The main step taken in this regard, the declaration of a Zone of
Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in 1977, was aimed at rendering the external security linkages of the individual
ASEAN members less provocative to adversaries like Vietnam and China.  ZOPFAN also underscored the primacy of ASEAN's
role as a forum for inter-member conflict-prevention and resolution.  In this context a military alliance, even if restricted to
the members of the grouping alone (that is, not involving any western powers as was the case with SEATO), was deemed to
be subversive of ASEAN's fundamental aims and objectives.  For one thing, it would have invited comparisons with the
discredited great power security guarantees of the cold war era, represented by the increasingly defunct SEATO.  Given the
security links between individual ASEAN states (except Indonesia) and Western powers, a military arrangement among the
former would provoke accusations of the `SEATOization' of ASEAN, thereby undermining the credibility of ZOPFAN.  This
consideration was especially important in view of Vietnam's increasingly shrill accusations that ` ASEAN will become another
SEATO and Japan and the US may use ASEAN as an organisation to expand their influence in Southeast Asia'8 It also explained
the opposition of Indonesia, which prided itself as the only genuine non-aligned country in ASEAN, to any ASEAN military
pact which smacked of dependence on Western security guarantees.  As Adam Malik put it, `Pacts are of no value and don't
really add strength to a region.'9 Carlos Romulo, the foreign minister of the Philippines agreed with this view: `We did not
phase out SEATO in order to set up another one'10
Although there was agreement among the member states in the formative years of ASEAN on the undesirability of a military
pact, military cooperation was not completely ruled out as a future option.  Tunku Abdul Rahman took a gradualist view of
ASEAN cooperation, arguing that the initial thrust of ASEAN should be on `economic and cultural matters' which were likely
to prove less controversial and more manageable.  If these initiatives proved successful, according to Tunku, then `efforts
could be made towards establishing a more far reaching organisation which would extend to political as well as security
fields.'11  Lee Kuan Yew agreed with this view: the initial focus of ASEAN, according to Lee, should be mutual benefit in the
field of economic cooperation.  This could later develop into other areas, including security and defence.12  On the eve of the
Bali summit, Lee contended that:
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First, you must have economic cooperation, then you go on to political and diplomatic coordination of policies, then
to intelligence coordination and sharing, which is already existing, then to other fields beyond that.13
While rejecting the need for a military alliance, ASEAN states were quietly forging bilateral links to cope with the threat of
subversion.  Bilateral cooperation against border insurgencies that had developed between Malaysia and Indonesia and
Malaysia and Thailand were considered to be acceptable models for security cooperation which would be sufficient to deal
with the threat at hand.  Furthermore, bilateralism was preferable to a formal alliance in view of the distinctive security
concerns of the ASEAN states.  Ghazali Shafie, the foreign minister of Malaysia, provided a cogent rationale for bilateralism
in an article written for the London Times of 22 November 1970:
projects under ASEAN (and other regional bodies) are generally limited in scope and necessarily restricted to the
lowest common denominator which is acceptable to all member countries...The limitation of regional cooperation
within a formal framework should not prevent countries of the region from trying to forge the closest possible links
on a bilateral basis with one another.  It may be, for example, that country X would be willing to establish such
links on specific subjects and would be prepared to engage in consultations including exchange of information, etc,
with country Y which she might not consider either appropriate or necessary to have with some other third country
on a multilateral basis.  Such bilateral contacts on any subject and at whatever level which may be mutually
acceptable should be pursued as far as possible.  In this way, an important criss-crossing network of bilateral links
will be established between and among the countries of Southeast Asia...In pursuance of this policy, Malaysia
has...entered into close bilateral economic/cultural and security/military arrangements with a number of countries
in the region.  Malaysia's joint border operations with Thailand in the Thai/Malaysian boundary and with Indonesia
on the Sarawak/Kalimantan border of East Malaysia as well as cooperation with Singapore in the context of the
Five Power Defence Arrangement, are cases in point in the field of security and defence.'14
The first major challenge to bilateralism came on the eve of the Bali summit.  In the lead up to Bali, the threat of insurgency
and subversion had pushed the ASEAN members towards regular exchanges of intelligence, both on a bilateral and, possibly
multilateral basis (as is evident from Lee's comments above).  But in the course of preparations towards the first ASEAN
summit, there were indications that sections within the Indonesian leadership were willing to move beyond bilateralism.  An
Indonesian study paper circulated prior to the summit was believed to have suggested the formation of a `joint council' for
defence cooperation and the holding joint military exercises among the ASEAN states.15  However, existing sensitivities
regarding a military role for ASEAN once again proved decisive.  Deliberations over security issues at the pre-summit meeting
of ASEAN foreign ministers in Pattaya, Thailand crystallized, as Carlos Romulo put it, the `general view...that security
considerations should not be institutionalised on an ASEAN basis.' At the Pattaya meeting ` complete agreement was reached
on the desirability of continued [bilateral cooperation] some of which ante-date the association.'16 The Declaration of ASEAN
Concord issued at Bali gave formal expression to this position by calling for the ` continuation of cooperation on a non-ASEAN
basis between member states in security matters in accordance with their mutual needs and interests.' Summing up the position
reached at Bali regarding security cooperation, the Malaysian prime minister, Hussein Onn, stated:
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It is obvious that ASEAN member states do not wish to change the character of ASEAN as a socio-economic
organisation into a security alliance as this would only create misunderstanding in the region and undermine the
positive achievements of ASEAN in promoting peace and stability through socio-economic and related fields...[The
Bali summit] reiterated the nature of ASEAN as a non-ideological, non-military  and non-antagonistic grouping.17
In the aftermath of the Bali summit, ASEAN policy-makers continued to reject the idea of multilateral security and defence
cooperation.  At the annual ASEAN foreign ministers' conference in Singapore in July 1977, the representatives from Malaysia
and Indonesia issued a joint statement proclaiming that the main threat to the region was the possibility of increased
subversive activities `which could be handled on a national and bilateral basis.'18 The Thai foreign minister declared that
military alliances were ` obsolete' and stressed that ASEAN had ` nothing to do with military cooperation.'19 This position was
reaffirmed at the Kuala Lumpur summit where the leaders were believed to have consulted closely on the threat posed by
subversive activities, but rejected any change to ASEAN's position on, and preference for, bilateralism.20 
Although the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia pushed ASEAN into the diplomatic limelight as a result of its successful
campaign to mobilize international public opinion against the Vietnamese action, its main security concern was expressed
not so much in terms of an advocacy of a military alliance to deal with the new situation, but in terms of deliberations over
possible contingency assistance to Thailand in the event of a spill-over of the conflict within Cambodia.  Like the subversion
issue before, coming to terms with Thailand's `frontline' status became the focal point of ASEAN's dilemma concerning
security collaboration.  Indonesia, which had previously denied that it would be obliged to aid Thailand in the event of
aggression,21 now asserted that it would provide aid to any ASEAN nation facing such a prospect.  Singapore and Malaysia
came up with similar pledges of help to Thailand against a Vietnamese attack.  Although none of the ASEAN partners provided
specifics regarding the kind of aid envisaged, provision of military aid was assumed to be included.  Indonesia's Coordinating
Minister for Political and Security Affairs, General Panggabean, stated that Indonesia's assistance could take the form of
economic as well as military aid.  ` If they [the threatened nation], are short of ammunition, we can give them ammunition.'22
Although it was not clear to what extent Panggabean's statement reflected the official Indonesian position, (a similar comment
by him in late 1970 that Indonesia would provide military assistance to its ASEAN neighbours against attack had been
dismissed by the then Foreign Minister, Adam Malik)23 they fuelled speculation concerning a major shift in Indonesia's
thinking on ASEAN security cooperation.  Malaysia was less forthcoming insofar as direct military aid was concerned.  Home
Minister Ghazalie Shafie stated that ` Our contribution will be in the form of helping the Thais building up their resilience or
by sending goods they are short of.'24 This indicated that Malaysia envisaged provision of logistics support, rather than troop
assistance, as the major form of aid to Thailand in the event of a Vietnamese attack.  Singapore's position was more or less
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similar, although the Republic, with its advanced defence production capability, was in a much better position than Malaysia
to provide logistics support as well as armaments to its threatened neighbour.25
While ASEAN leaders generally hinted that any contingency aid to Thailand could be provided on a bilateral, rather then
multilateral, basis, it was evident that the Vietnamese action had prompted ASEAN policy-making circles to rethink their
position on collective security.26  President Marcos appeared to be more receptive to the idea of ASEAN security cooperation,
which he thought was necessary as a measure `to stem the tide of insurgency.'27  Adam Malik, the former foreign minister
of Indonesia who had been on record as opposing a military role for ASEAN while in power, now proposed that ASEAN should
hold a military exercise of 10,000 troops on the Thai-Cambodian border to demonstrate its unity to Vietnam.28  Thailand,
while taking a cautious and ambivalent view towards the need for an ASEAN alliance (because the `time is not [ripe] yet'),
nonetheless supported the idea of joint ASEAN military exercises as a response to the new security situation.  In June 1979,
Prime Minister Kriangsak Chomanan declared that, `if the ASEAN governments desire to hold joint manoeuvres, why can't
we do it? But we have to wait for the proper time.'29  At the same time, he expressed readiness to participate in such exercises:
`however, if anyone would like to have joint exercises, we are ready.  Manoeuvres can be held in Thailand or if they are held
elsewhere, we can send forces there.'30
But translating the pledges made by Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore to provide contingency support to Thailand into a
framework for ASEAN-wide security cooperation against external threats proved to be elusive.  Any temptation to form an
ASEAN military arrangement to provide contingency support to Thailand against Vietnam needed to be tempered by the
prevailing pessimism concerning ASEAN's collective ability to stand up to an all-out Vietnamese attack.  As Lee Kuan Yew
warned: `there is no combination of forces in Southeast Asia that can stop the Vietnamese on the mainland of Asia.'31 More
importantly, the differing perspectives within ASEAN on Sino-Vietnamese rivalry, telescoped by the Cambodia crisis, proved
to be a major barrier to greater intra-ASEAN political and security cooperation.  This aspect reflected lack of agreement over
the identity of a common external threat which might have served as the basis of multilateral security collaboration.
Thailand's policy of seeking China's support against Vietnam served to exacerbate these differences.  While the Thai position
was based on the calculation that Chinese pressure on the Vietnamese border reduced the threat to Thailand, the Chinese
pledges of assistance to Thailand were not conducive to the forging of an ASEAN security consensus.  Malaysia and Indonesia
expressed misgivings about the Thai position, based on their long-standing perception that it was China, rather than the Soviet
Union or Vietnam, that posed the most serious long-term threat to regional security and stability.  Their recognition of
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Vietnam's potential as a ` countervailing force against China,'32 meant eschewing a military role for ASEAN which would have
provoked and further alienated Vietnam at a time when both Malaysia and Indonesia continued to harbour hopes of an
eventual rapproachment with Hanoi.  Neither did Thailand wish the formation of a multilateral security pact within ASEAN
which could have facilitated prompt assistance to it in time of need.  The logistical (especially lack of air transport capability)
and operational (lack of practice in joint operations with Thai forces) barriers to such an arrangement were enormous and
recognized in Thai contingency planning.  For the Thais, seeking assistance from the US (under the auspices of the Manila
Pact and the Rusk-Thanat agreement) was a much more credible policy against the Vietnamese threat than relying on its
ASEAN partners.  In fact, it was highly doubtful that the ASEAN states would have ventured to come to Bangkok's aid in the
event of a major Vietnamese offensive without some sort of US security guarantee against possible retaliation by Hanoi.
ASEAN's rejection of a military pact has been maintained despite concerns not only over domestic insurgency or intra-regional
conflict, but also security threats perceived from external powers.  This was most evident from its response to the emergence
of a strong Soviet-Vietnamese security partnership and a Soviet naval presence in the region in the early 1980s.  The Soviet
move was alarming to ASEAN leaders who regarded the existing `balance of power' between the superpowers in the region
as a key factor in ensuring regional stability.  Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew provided the clearest expression
of this concern.  At a press conference in Jakarta on 9 November 1982, he advocated an expansion of existing bilateral
military exercises, such as those between Singapore and Indonesia:
At a later stage the exercises may become trilateral and later quadrilateral.  It's a matter which will have to evolve
naturally.  We feel the next stage - the trilateral exercises - is simple.  The ideal would be multilateral exercises
encompassing all the [ASEAN] members.  But at least quadrilateral, so that there is no misunderstanding as to the
perception of the threats.33
Lee's suggestion was important not because it contained a new idea concerning ASEAN defence cooperation, but because it
once again tested the position of the ASEAN states on one of its more sensitive issues.  In this respect, the response from the
two key ASEAN nations, Thailand and Indonesia, was particularly noteworthy.  Thailand, ASEAN's so-called frontline state
which stood to lose most if the regional balance of power shifted in favour of Vietnam and the Soviet Union, ironically came
up with the bluntest and most categorical rejection of Lee's idea.  Noting that the Singapore leader was venting his concern
`about the expansion of Soviet influence in the region,' Thai foreign minister Siddhi Savetsila, stated: `We in ASEAN don't
want to be seen as a military pact...and even though regional security relates to all of us, we have never agreed to have
multilateral military exercises.'34  Sections within the Thai media saw Lee's proposal as deliberate `kite flying' which might
`provide ideal grist for Hanoi's propaganda machine.'35  The initial Indonesian response to Lees suggestion was more cautious,
with State Secretary Sudharmono saying that it `should be considered.'36  However, a few days later Vice President Adam
Malik was openly sceptical, reiterating the familiar Indonesian view that existing bilateral linkages among ASEAN states were
sufficient to deal with the emerging security threats and that any multilateral exercises, which would be `similar to ASEAN
opening a new front,' would provoke the `other side.'37 
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To sum up, bilateralism has endured as the principal mode of security collaboration within ASEAN (with the exception of
intelligence exchanges) despite perceived challenges to regional security arising at three different `levels': domestic
insurgency and subversion in the early and mid-1970s, intra-regional conflict following the Vietnamese invasion of
Cambodia, and extra-regional threats perceived from the Soviet presence in the South China Sea in the early 1980s.  A
number of factors have contributed to this, including: the preoccupation of ASEAN states with domestic stability; their fear
of provoking Vietnam (and its communist allies) and the attendant dangers of being embroiled in superpower rivalry; the
futility of an alliance in view of the military weakness of the ASEAN states; and the flexibility and perceived advantages of
bilateral cooperation over alliance.  But perhaps the most important conclusion is that while the ASEAN states have
consistently and unequivocally rejected the idea of a formal military alliance to institutionalize and broaden bilateral security
cooperation, their position on multilateral cooperation within an informal and possibly non-ASEAN framework has been much
less rejectionist.  The idea of joint exercises in particular found favour within sections of the policy-making elite of ASEAN
states from time to time.  It is against this backdrop that one may examine the key areas of bilateral defence and security
cooperation which have evolved within ASEAN since its inception.  While a detailed description of each form of cooperation
is beyond the scope of this paper, the following sections will highlight four major forms of cooperation: border security
arrangements, intelligence sharing, joint military exercises and training, and, most importantly, the implications of intra-
ASEAN arms transfers and equipment standardization for the prospect of an ASEAN defence industry.
Border Region Cooperation
Border region cooperation is the foundation of bilateral security arrangements between ASEAN states.  Agreements between
Indonesia and the Philippines to check illegal activities on their maritime border and Thailand and Malaysia to stamp out
insurgents operating along their common land border predate the formation of ASEAN.  The Bangkok agreement (not to be
confused with the Bangkok Declaration on the formation of ASEAN) proclaiming an end to the Indonesia-Malaysia
Confrontation paved the way for cooperation between the two countries geared to suppress the communist insurgency on their
common (Sarawak-Kalimantan) border.  The significance of these agreements go beyond countering common threats to the
domestic stability of ASEAN members posed by communist insurgency and other illegal activities.  Given that the spillover
effect of insurgencies across national boundaries often created the potential for friction between neighbouring ASEAN states
(as in the case of Thailand and Malaysia during the late 1970s and early 1980s as well as between Indonesia and Malaysia
over Sukarno's support for Sarawak communists during the Confrontation), bilateral border security arrangements are also
an important indicator of the process of conflict-management between ASEAN states.
Of the four bilateral border security agreements among the ASEAN states, that between Malaysia and the Philippines (signed
in 1977) has made little headway, pending a mutually satisfactory solution to the Sabah dispute.38  In contrast, cooperation
between Indonesia and the Philippines (the two signed a Border Crossing Agreement in May 1961, which was followed by
a Joint Border Patrol Agreement in 1975) has been more active and effective.39  Border cooperation between the two countries
covers a broader range of security threats.  The 1975 agreement identified these as smuggling, illegal fishing and immigration,
piracy and drug smuggling.40  While the anti-insurgency aspects of this agreement have been downplayed, the general
objective is to increase law enforcement against any activity threatening the security of either country.41  Joint border patrols
have been carried out since 1961.  The two sides currently organize annual coordinated patrols (CORPATPHILINDO) in the
waterway between southern Mindanao and northern Sulawesi involving patrol craft and maritime reconnaissance aircraft.42
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But it is the bilateral agreements between Thailand and Malaysia and Malaysia and Indonesia which have produced the most
active and far reaching border security cooperation in ASEAN, and hence deserve special attention here.  In conceptual and
operational terms, the two agreements are similar, although their record in contributing to the suppression of insurgency has
been different.  The Thai-Malaysian agreement is the oldest bilateral border security arrangement in ASEAN, governed by a
series of agreements dating back to 1949, with the agreement currently in force signed in 1977.43  The basic framework for
Indonesia-Malaysia border cooperation was the May 1966 Bangkok Agreement, in which joint operations against border
region communist activity ` was agreed upon without any formal agreement being signed.'44  This understanding was followed
by an exchange of letters in March 1967.  In 1972, the two countries signed a Border Security Agreement, which was revised
and expanded in 1984.45  
The two border security agreements are designed to cope with a broad range of security threats and illegal activities, although
communist insurgency is the principal target.  Thai-Malaysian cooperation is geared principally against the remnants of the
Communist Party of Malay (CPM) which retreated into Thai territory following the successful British counter-insurgency
campaign in Malay.  But it has also provided the basis for a wider security understanding between the two sides especially
in the wake of the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia.  It has been suggested that Malaysia's campaign against the CPM
operating in the Thai-Malaysian border area provided the Thais some relief at a time when Bangkok had to devote attention
and resources to the threat on its northern flank.46  Border cooperation between Indonesia and Malaysia has encompassed even
wider security implications.  It initially focused on communist insurgents on the land border between the Kalimantan state
of Indonesia and the Sarawak state of Malaysia.  Under the 1984 agreement, the scope of cooperation was extended to include
the maritime border in the Strait of Malacca while the `common enemy' was redefined and broadened to include smugglers,
drug traffickers and counterfeiters.47  The scope of cooperation covers cross border traffic, smuggling and defence
cooperation, the latter including anti-insurgency operations as well as exercises and contingency planning against ` external'
threats.
In sharp contrast to the unwillingness of ASEAN countries to create any multilateral fora to promote security cooperation
within ASEAN, (such as rejection of the idea of an ASEAN interior or defence ministers meeting) bilateral border security
arrangements between Malaysia and Thailand and Malaysia and Indonesia are remarkably institutionalized.  In the case of
Thai-Malaysian cooperation, the 1959 agreement created two committees, one to coordinate policy, the second to oversee
joint operations against insurgents.  These two were forerunners of the General Border Committee (GBC) and the Regional
Border Committee (RBC) respectively.  The main responsibility of the GBC, headed initially by the interior ministers of the
two countries (later defence ministers) is to make general policy decisions on measures to counter and eliminate insurgents
on the Thai-Malaysian border.  The RBC, co-chaired by the Commander of the Thai Fourth Army and the Malaysian Corps
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Commander, is responsible for devising specific methods and tactics to fight the insurgents, to coordinate intelligence
collection and sharing, and supervise combined operations between Malaysian and Thai forces.  Malaysia-Indonesia border
cooperation is similarly supervised by a joint border committee created under the 1972 agreement.  The task of the committee
is to ` confer on appropriate measures to be adopted with a view to eliminating the communist threat along the common border
of...[the] two countries and also other matters pertaining to security in...border regions.'48  The committee is headed by the
Commander of the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI) on the Indonesian side and the defence minister on the Malaysian side.
At the operational level, planning, intelligence-sharing and joint operations within the framework of Thai-Malaysian border
cooperation are overseen by a Regional Border Committee Office (RBCO) located in Songkhla, headed by a Thai military
officer.  Military cooperation under the auspices of the Indonesia-Malaysian border committee is the responsibility of a Staff
Planning Committee jointly headed by senior military officials from both sides.  In 1987, the mechanism for joint military
activities under the Indonesia-Malaysia border committee was further streamlined with the creation of a new committee,
Coordinated Operations Central Committee (COCC).49 
The scope of both the Thai-Malaysian and Malaysia-Indonesia border security arrangements includes a variety of operational
as well as non-operational measures of which the most important ones include intelligence-sharing, joint exercises, and joint
operations.  The original Thai-Malaysian agreement of 1949 provided for exchange of intelligence on an informal basis, while
the 1965 agreement led to the creation of a `Combined Intelligence Headquarters' in Songkhla `to follow the movement of
and exchange news' on insurgents.50  Both the Thai-Malaysia and Indonesia-Malaysia border arrangements permit reciprocal
posting of field intelligence teams in each other's territory.  Exchange of tactical intelligence on the strength and movement
of insurgents as well as exchange of information and experience on how to deal with insurgencies remain a key aspect of
cooperation to date.
In both arrangements, bilateral military exercises were initiated as part of the campaign against insurgents within the
framework of border cooperation.  The range and frequency of exercises between Indonesia and Malaysia have been much
more extensive than that between Malaysia and Thailand.  The Malaysia-Indonesia border committee organized annual army
exercises of the Kekar Malindo series.  (It should be noted that the objective of these exercises has not been limited to
counter-insurgency alone.  In recent years, the purpose of the Kekar Malindo exercises has shifted towards training in
`conventional warfare and defence tactics.'51) The Thai-Malaysia Regional Border Committee launched two exercises: the
Sea Ex-Thamal series of naval exercises begining in 1979, and the Air Thamal series of annual air exercises from 1982
whose objective was ` to mount tactical air operations in support of ground troops operating against communist terrorists along
the border area.'52  The Air Thamal exercises have since been staged alternately from Butterworth in Malaysia and Haddyai
in Thailand.
Insofar as joint operations against insurgents were concerned, the terms of the 1977 Thai-Malaysian agreement specified three
types of operations: unilateral, coordinated, and combined.  Unilateral operations were to be carried out independently by
the security forces of each side on their respective borders, but both sides were granted the right of `hot pursuit' subject to
prior approval by the other side for the distance and duration of the border crossing.  In the case of coordinated operations,
Border Region Cooperation / 11
     53 Text of the `Agreement Between the Government of Malaysia and the Government of Thailand on Border
Cooperation,' Asian Defence Journal, (January 1977).
     54 Personal interview with Malaysian military official, Kuala Lumpur, 22 August 1989.
     55 Surin Pitsuan, Issues Affecting Border Security Between Malaysia and Indonesia, Monograph Series No. 4
(Research Centre, Faculty of Political Science, Thamasat University), pp. 10-17.
     56 `Operation Cooperation: The Malaysian/Thai Joint Border Operations,' Asian Defence Journal (October 1977),
p.21.
security forces of both sides would operate within their own side of the border, with their movement, including any border
crossings in hot pursuit, coordinated by two Combined Task Force Headquarters (under the agreement, each side was to create
such a headquarters).  Combined operations were to be planned jointly by the Combined Task Force Headquarters of both
sides or higher agencies.  In these operations, security forces from both sides would be deployed on either the Malaysian or
Thai side of the border from the very start of operations.53  The Thai-Malaysia border concept of joint operations served as
a model for the Indonesia-Malaysia arrangement, with joint operations in the case of the latter divided into unilateral,
coordinated and combined types.54
But the record of Thai-Malaysian cooperation differs markedly from that of Malaysia-Indonesia cooperation both in terms
of effectiveness in checking the insurgency and avoidance of suspicions and misgivings regarding the sincerity of either side
in helping one another.  During the 1970s and early 1980s, Thai-Malaysian border cooperation was plagued by two major
political difficulties.  The first was Thai sensitivities towards the right of `hot pursuit' granted to Malaysian security forces
under the border agreement and the presence of Malaysian field police units in Thai territory (Betong).  The 1959 agreement
allowing border crossing by Malaysian troops into Thai territory in pursuit of CPM guerillas sparked off protest in Thailand
on the grounds that it compromised Thai sovereignty.  A new agreement signed in 1965 had to be revised in order to reflect
Thai sensitivities, which sought specification that the right of hot pursuit would be given to Malaysian `police field forces'
rather than Malaysian ` soldiers.' This conflicted with Malaysia's intention, in the wake of the Kuala Lumpur race riots in 1969,
to pursue an aggressive campaign against the CPM's activities in southern Thailand.  With the advent of an elected parliament,
however, the Thai government grew ever more sensitive towards the presence of Malaysian security forces in Betong.  When
the CPM sought to exploit the situation by organizing demonstrations in Betong in May-June 1976 demanding the expulsion
of Malaysian Field Police Units stationed there (numbering some 410 personnel), the government of Seni Promaj asked for
the withdrawal of Malaysian units.55
The October 1976 coup in Thailand which brought the staunchly anti-communist regime of Prime Minister Thanin
Kraivichien to power gave a new lease of life to border security cooperation.  It led to the signing of a new agreement to
replace the 1970 accord, which in turn paved the way for the first ever combined operations between the two sides against
CPM insurgents.  These operations, launched in January 1977, and code named Daoyi Musnah (Big Star), followed by
Cahaya Bena (Sacred Light), produced a number of results: including the confirmation of the strength of the CPM (between
3,000-3,500), a better understanding of its tactics and plans, and the destruction of CPM sanctuaries, temporary disruptions
of its logistics and operational infrastructure as well as recruiting exercises.56  In the wake of these operations, Malaysian
security and intelligence units, their strength probably reduced, resumed their position inside Thai territory.  Combined and
coordinated operations continued into the late 1970s, and Malaysian troops assumed a greater burden of these operations as
Thailand confronted the threat on its border with Cambodia following the Vietnamese invasion. 
While the political crisis over the presence inside Thai territory of Malaysian units was diffused, open and bitter complaints
by the Thai fourth army commander, General Harn Lenanond, in 1982-83 regarding alleged Malaysian support for the Muslim
separatists in southern Thailand, was much more damaging to Thai-Malaysian security relations.  Outspoken General Harn
gave open expression to Thailand's long-standing suspicions that Malaysia was secretly aiding and abetting its southern
separatists.  Harn demanded that Malaysia should not only cease such support, but assist Thailand in its campaign against
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the southern `bandits' within the framework of their border agreement.  Harn also wanted right of hot pursuit against the
separatists.  Malaysia responded to these charges by insisting that the latter was strictly an internal matter of Thailand and
lay beyond the scope of the border agreement.  It also alleged on the part of Thailand a ` live and let live' attitude towards the
CPM.  In 1982, General Saiyud Kerdphol acknowledged that:
there [is]...mutual suspicion or distrust [between Malaysia and Thailand] which we must eliminate...The Malaysians
suspect Thais of not being engaged in a real campaign of suppression against the communists along the common
border.  We Thais suspect the Malaysians of supporting the separatists so that they would help in combatting the
communist terrorists.  Such suspicions can only be useful to the common enemy.57
On the Malaysian side, Home Minister Musa Hitam expressed deep frustration over the record of border cooperation at the
opening ceremony of the 27th meeting of the GBC.  Contending that the two sides were `not achieving as much as [they]
should have' in their joint effort to combat the communist threat, Musa pointed out that the communist strength had actually
increased to 1,843 from the `original 600 or so members who took refuge in southern Thailand between 1953 and 1960.'58
This necessitated a review of the existing arrangements, since:
After all, 20 to 25 years [of border cooperation] is a fairly long time in the context of eliminating a few thousand
forces.  Under the circumstances, it is my view that the border committee should take serious cognizance of this
and make appropriate assessment as to whether it has truly been successful or otherwise.59
The strains in Thai-Malaysia border cooperation were reflected in the fact that no combined or coordinated operations were
carried out during the 1980-84 period.60  While Harn's successor as commander of the Thai Fourth Army, General Wanchai
Chitchamnong, managed to revive coordinated operations (in which Thai troops would carry out an offensive on their side
of the border while Malaysian troops would be deployed on their side of the border to trap the insurgents fleeing the Thai
offensive)61 by toning down the demand for Malaysian help against the southern Muslim separatists, combined operations
were not resumed.  As the Malaysian Inspector General of Police put it in 1986, `The current policy is that we manage the
problem on our side and they [the Thais] manage the problem on their side, but we still cooperate.'62  
Overall, the Thai-Malaysian joint operations can not be said to have been very effective in suppressing the CPM.  Although
the CPM suffered a serious decline of strength and morale in the early 1980s, with its membership reduced to about 1,000 by
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1987,63 this decline can not be attributed to joint operations by Thailand and Malaysia.64  To be sure, the operations, as the
Chief of the Malaysian Army, General Mohammed Salleh, claimed, `put a lot of pressure on the terrorists, forcing them to
be on the move constantly,' 65 but the more important causes for the decline of the CPM had to do with the loss of material
support from China (for which both Malaysia and Thailand can take some credit) as well as the effectiveness of the amnesty
programme carried out by Thailand since 1980.  The tripartite agreement between Malaysia, Thailand and CPM leader Chin
Peng which led to the disbandment of the CPM in December 1989, is apt to be regarded by Thai authorities as a vindication
of their approach, which had been endorsed by Malaysia after some initial differences over the repatriation and resettlement
of the surrendered communists.  The exit of the CPM leaves the future direction of Thai-Malaysian border cooperation unclear,
although both sides are likely to cooperate on the socio-economic development of the border areas as well as maintain
intelligence coordination to guard against any revival of the communist insurgency. 
While the record of Thai-Malaysian cooperation is illustrative of the sensitivities and suspicions that affect bilateral security
cooperation in ASEAN, the record of Indonesia-Malaysia cooperation reflects how the imperative for security collaboration
has helped ASEAN members to overcome these sensitivities and strengthened the norms of conflict-management in ASEAN.
The fact that a common concern against border insurgency was a factor in the desire of both sides to put an end to Sukarno's
Confrontation was evident from the swiftness with which the two sides moved to organize joint operations against the
remnants of the North Kalimantan Communist Party.  Following the signing of a border agreement in 1972, the two sides
launched their first combined operation, code named Seri Aman, in 1974.  It led to the surrender of 500 NKCP members led
by a high-ranking leader.  The operation was believed to have been effective in damaging the political organization and
military structure of the insurgents, in breaking the communication links between the 1st Bureau of the NKCP in the first
division and the 2nd bureau in the third division of Sarawak.  The strength of the communists fell to 170 active elements after
the operation.  The next major joint operation was Operation Kemudi in early 1982, produced 39 guerrilla casualties, 15
captures and 49 surrenders; it was claimed to have reduced the strength of the NKCP to 96 active guerrillas.66
Indeed, the Indonesia-Malaysia joint operations were part of a successful counterinsurgency policy which saw a drastic
decline in the strength of the insurgents.  Malaysian intelligence sources estimated in 1979 that the number of insurgents in
Sarawak's Rajang Security Command had fallen to 96, while those in Sarawak's first and second divisions had fallen to 22.67
On the Indonesian side, Defence Minister General Mohammed Jusuf claimed in 1982 that Kalimantan had been ` cleared' of
communist guerillas belonging to North Kalimantan People's Army (Paraku) and Sarawak People's Guerilla Forces (PGRS),
although a number of rebels still remained on the Malaysian side of the Kalimantan-Sarawak border.68  Four years later, an
even more optimistic picture of the communist threat was given by both sides.  According to Malaysian Defence Minister,
Ahmed Badawi, the strength of the insurgents on the Indonesia-Malaysia border had fallen to less than 100 from an estimated
1500 in 1974.69  According to Badawi, the strength of the communists had been ` so reduced that they are no longer a serious
threat.'70 Indonesia's armed forces commander General Benny Murdani proclaimed Indonesia's border areas to be ` clean,' with
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the last remnants of the insurgents inside Indonesian territory caught in early 1986.71  Recent official estimates from Malaysia
put the number of NKCP insurgents on the border area at 42.72
The smooth functioning of border cooperation between Indonesia and Malaysia is reflected in the fact that the failure of the
border committee to convene for three years during 1980-82, reportedly due to domestic preoccupations of Defence Minister
Jusuf, was hardly noticed.  During this time, the various subcommittees of the border committee as well as the Staff Planning
Committee ` went on with their work without interruption.'73  An even more important indication is that the border committee,
satisfied with the progress of cooperation against the communist threat, has adopted a wider perspective on security
cooperation, especially possible threats from the South China Sea, including communist infiltration.  It has proved to be an
useful forum for discussion on defence issues covering internal as well as external threats.  This shift was clearly indicated
at the 13th meeting of the border committee in 1984 which reviewed the 1972 security agreement.  Apart from expanding
the scope of the agreement, the two sides discussed measures to step up air and naval exercises, joint purchase of defence
equipment and supplies and the sharing of servicing and support facilities for the navies and air forces of the two countries.74
The 14th meeting of the border committee held in Kuching in November 1985 was even more significant in `externalising'
the border committee's security orientation.  During that meeting, the Malaysian defence minister and the Indonesian armed
forces commander discussed, according to press reports later confirmed by Musa Hitam, `contingency plans that could be
put into effect should conflicts in the region escalate to pose a threat to the security of the two countries.' The meeting led to
understanding on greater cooperation to monitor sea traffic in the Straits of Malacca and finalized an agreement permitting
Malaysia to use Indonesia's Natuna island for military purposes, including joint exercises with Indonesia.75  
Intelligence-Sharing
One of the more crucial forms of security cooperation among the ASEAN states is intelligence-sharing and exchange.  These
exchanges take place both at a bilateral as well as multilateral level and involve both military as well as national intelligence
agencies.  The intelligence branches of ASEAN armed forces often communicate and cooperate with each other directly, or
as part of combined national delegations including members from the national intelligence bodies.  Furthermore, intelligence
sharing covers both tactical matters (such as cooperation against border insurgencies) and strategic and policy issues including
overall threat assessments.
Within ASEAN a number of bilateral intelligence-sharing arrangements emerged during the late 1960s and 1970s as a result
of the worsening situation in Indochina and the rising threat of communist subversion.  A significant aspect of these
arrangements was the fact that some of them involved countries which were not part of formal bilateral border security
agreements such as those between Malaysia and Thailand or Malaysia and Indonesia.  Thus intelligence arrangements
provided an alternative form of security collaboration against the threat of insurgency and subversion within ASEAN.
As seen earlier, intelligence-sharing between Malaysia and Thailand as well as Malaysia and Indonesia grew out of their
border security arrangements.  In these cases, as well as in the case of bilateral ties between Singapore and Indonesia, contacts
and exchange of information between intelligence agencies have often proved to be the crucial first step towards more
comprehensive forms of defence and security cooperation.  (Intelligence agencies played an instrumental role during the
negotiations between Malaysia and Indonesia to end their confrontation.)  Though not having a formal security agreement,
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Indonesia and Singapore had begun regular intelligence exchanges soon after the end of the Confrontation, a fact indicated
in comments by Lee Kuan Yew during his visit to Jakarta in 1982.76  A more notable instance of bilateral intelligence
cooperation involved Malaysia and Singapore, whose intelligence links survived the strains caused by the latter's separation
from Malaysia.  In December 1976, during Lee Kuan Yew's trip to Malaysia, the two leaders were believed to have reviewed
what one press report described as `cooperative security arrangements between their two countries against communist
infiltration and subversion, including the exchange of intelligence on movements of communists between Malaysia and
Singapore.'77  This was confirmed by the Prime Minister of Malaysia, Mahathir Mohammed, in remarks made in December
1981:
Never have we [Malaysia and Singapore] even once failed to cooperate in matters relating to the threat of
subversion against our society.  The security apparatuses of our two societies continue to cooperate against any
subversive and criminal elements that could affect our stability even when political leaders were openly
squabbling.78 
Developments in Indochina leading to the Bali Summit widened and strengthened intra-ASEAN intelligence cooperation.
Thailand and the Philippines reached an understanding on intelligence-exchanges during Thai Prime Minister Thanin's visit
to Manila in December 1976, when he and Marcos `agreed to continue to cooperate in combatting internal insurgency and
subversion through consultations and exchanges of intelligence and views.'79 Around this time, Singapore and the Philippines
also reached an accord providing for intelligence exchanges and holding of consultations on problems of insurgency.80  In
1978, Thai Prime Minister Kriangsak confirmed exchange of `military information' between Bangkok and Jakarta.81 
Although ASEAN countries still refuse to publicly acknowledge any multilateral intelligence exchanges, there are indications
that such practices had developed around the time of the Bali summit.  As cited earlier, Lee Kuan Yew's comments in 1976
on the need for functional incrementalism in ASEAN cooperation, which acknowledged `intelligence coordination and
cooperation, which is already existing' (emphasis added), is one such indication.  A clearer hint was given by President
Marcos in December 1976 in the wake of his agreement with the Thai Prime Minister concerning intelligence and information
exchanges.  As Marcos put it: 
Of course, there has been an agreement for an exchange of information, of views and intelligence among the
countries in Southeast Asia for the past four years.  So it [the Thai-Philippine agreement on intelligence-sharing]
merely reiterates this understanding. (emphasis added)82
What Marcos was referring to could be the practice of secret annual meetings of intelligence agencies of all the ASEAN
countries, which grew out of bilateral dealings already commonplace.83  While the origins of these meetings remain obscure,
the practice has continued, with ASEAN countries taking turns in hosting these meetings and coordinating the agenda.
Delegations to these meeting are drawn from the military and the national intelligence agencies of the member states.  The
meetings are informal, and topics for discussion range from sharing of information and experience relating to insurgencies
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to developments in the wider region, including external threats to regional security.  To be sure, the continued dependence
of the ASEAN states on friendly Western intelligence agencies, reflecting the lack of adequate indigenous intelligence-
gathering resources, is a major limitation of ASEAN intelligence cooperation.  Furthermore, there is little cooperation in the
field of electronic intelligence and surveillance, despite the fact that the E-2C Hawkeye Airborne Early Warning aircraft
acquired by Singapore offers considerable opportunities in this area.  But the significance of existing intelligence cooperation
should not be downplayed.  Intelligence sharing is the only known form of multilateral security cooperation among the ASEAN
states and it provides a precedent for multilateral meetings of ASEAN defence officials (which has been resisted so far) as well
as the gradual extension of bilateral security ties into trilateral and multilateral arrangements.
Joint Exercises and Training
Bilateral Exercises
As seen earlier, the first bilateral military exercises within ASEAN were undertaken as part of the border region
counterinsurgency cooperation between Malaysia and Thailand and Malaysia and Indonesia.  Since then bilateral exercises
have proliferated, and are being conducted with much greater regularity and frequency.  According to one estimate, the
number of such exercises per year has increased from three in 1972 to 15 in 1986 (this does not include exercises conducted
under the Five Power Defence Arrangements.)84 Bilateral exercises in ASEAN now involve all three main branches of the
armed forces as well as paramilitary units.
A list of bilateral exercises between ASEAN member states, presented in Appendix 1, points to three interesting features.  The
first, and most obvious conclusion is that naval and air exercises are much more common than land exercises.  This is perhaps
explained by the fact that air and maritime exercises are somewhat less vulnerable to political sensitivities and suspicions in
intra-ASEAN bilateral relations than land exercises.  Lingering suspicions and mutual threat perceptions between ASEAN
countries have in the past accounted for their reluctance to allow each others' land forces in their territory, (fears that such
exercises could be used for ` territorial familiarisation' still persist). In addition, there were concerns, as illustrated in the case
of Thai-Malaysian joint border operations against the CPM, that the presence of foreign troops might become a provocative
issue in the domestic politics of the host nation and lend itself to exploitation by the latter's insurgent/opposition groups.  In
contrast, air and naval exercises can be conducted offshore and are much less visibile.  Malaysia and Indonesia were the major
exception to this reluctance to engage in land exercises, Apart from the Kekar Malindo series organized by the Border
Committee, the two countries also participated in Tatar Malindo and Kirpura Malindo army exercises.  Recent developments
also point to a breaking down of the political barriers to land exercises involving the rest of ASEAN states.  The Semangat
Bersatu army exercise between Singapore and Malaysia held in May 1989 and the Safkar Indopura Command Post exercises
between army units of Indonesia and Singapore held in December 1989, provide the most significant indication of this trend.
The greater number of air and maritime exercises also reflects the gradual switch by the armed forces of the key ASEAN
military powers, especially Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, from counter-insurgency to conventional warfare doctrines
and capabilities.  This shift not only reflects the decline of communist insurgencies in these countries, but also a variety of
other factors such as the erosion of great power security guarantees, and the emergence of new security challenges relating
to the regional maritime environment.85  Given that the transition to conventional force postures have been marked by a visible
emphasis on the acquisition of air and naval capabilities, the latter in turn have provided greater opportunity and scope for
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the Straits Times of Singapore revealed in March 1989 that the chiefs of staff of the armed forces of the three
countries had `secretly' met in Bali in 1988, allegedly at the initiative of General Benny Murdani of Indonesia. 
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bilateral training and exercises involving these services, thereby providing a way around the difficulties involved in land
exercises.  Thus, the greater conventional warfare mission of the armed forces of the major ASEAN powers is indicated in the
institution of new naval and air exercises, as well as the reorientation of existing exercises such as the Sea Ex-Thamal (which
gave way to Thalay exercises organized outside the framework of border cooperation) and the Air Thamal series (which is
likely to be replaced with air defence manoeuvres) between Malaysia and Thailand.
The second important conclusion from the list is the position of Indonesia as the `lynch-pin' of the interlocking web of
bilateral exercises in ASEAN.  Indonesia has not only been the first to encourage and participate in bilateral exercises in
ASEAN, (the first bilateral exercise between ASEAN members, a naval exercise between Malaysia and Indonesia, took place
in May 1972) it has also developed the most comprehensive and extensive schedule of exercises with its ASEAN neighbours.
An interesting illustration of this has been provided by a Japanese source, which estimated that out of the 45 bilateral ASEAN
exercises it recorded between May 1972 and the end of 1980, Indonesia participated 38 times, followed by Malaysia (26),
Thailand (nine), Singapore (seven) and the Philippines (six).86  Indonesia's bilateral exercise programme with Malaysia is the
most comprehensive one in ASEAN.  Apart from separate air, naval and ground exercises (as well as police and search and
rescue exercises), Indonesia and Malaysia conducted the first bilateral exercises in ASEAN involving all three branches of the
armed forces in 1982 (exercise Darsasa Malindo).  Donald Weatherbee has contended that the ` strong core' of intra-ASEAN
bilateral exercises is to be found ` in the de facto Malaysian-Indonesian security alliance.'87 This observation accords well with
an official estimate provided by the Malaysian military attache in Jakarta in 1984, which revealed that between 1972 and 1984
(May) Malaysia and Indonesia had conducted 32 joint exercises, including 12 Elang Malindo air exercises, 12 Malindo Jaya
naval exercises and eight Kekar Malindo army exercises.88  The extent of miliatry cooperation is further underscored by
comments by General Benny Murdani of Indonesia, who described his country's security ties with Malaysia as the closest
and the best bilateral security relationship within ASEAN.89 
The concept of an ASEAN security ` core' would seem to require redefinition and broadening if one takes into account the third,
and perhaps most important, conclusion to emerge from the above list of intra-ASEAN bilateral military exercises.  This
concerns the fact that several of the recently instituted bilateral exercises in ASEAN, including the two most recent army
exercises, involve Singapore, indicating a greater acceptance of the Republic in intra-ASEAN security relations, especially by
its two Malay neighbours.  This trend assumes significance in view of increasing speculation in media and academic circles
that a likely direction for ASEAN military ties might be the consolidation of an emerging triangular security relationship
between Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore.  Although this may seem a bit far-fetched to sceptics still adhering to the image
of Singapore as a `Chinese island in a sea of Malays,' it is not entirely unfounded.  Indeed, the leaders of Singapore, while
cognizant of the problems inherent in a trilateral defence arrangement,90 nonetheless hold the view that trilateralism may be
a useful way to expand the existing security ties within ASEAN.  In the words of Foreign Minister Wong Kan Seng:
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As our defence forces evolve and political relationships mature, it becomes possible to explore new ways for
regional states to contribute to regional security in response to the changing strategic equation among the major
powers.  Living cheek by jowl with each other, the security of Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia is indivisible.
Thailand's security affects us as well.  ASEAN is not a security organisation.  But there could be more bilateral
exercises which over the long term could be expanded to become overlapping trilateral exercises.91
But the concept of a `triangular' defence arrangement is not feasible for a number of reasons.  As will be discussed later,
bilateral suspicions and political problems between Malaysia and Singapore remain a key factor, as is Malaysia's concern that
growing defence links between Singapore and Indonesia could be at the expense of Malaysia-Indonesia security relations.
But while ASEAN-wide or trilateral military exercises are unlikely to materialize in the near future, the proliferation of bilateral
exercises testifies to an increasing recognition of their usefulness by the ASEAN countries.  Bilateral exercises are deemed to
have a deterrent value, whether or not they are conducted in relation to the notion of a common threat.92  Moreover, such
exercises, which frequently aim at developing common operating procedures, modes of command and control, tactics and
inter-operability between the armed forces of the participating states, could facilitate mutual help, including joint operations
against a common security threat.  Bilateral air exercises among the ASEAN countries provide a good indication of such an
objective.  It has been suggested that the launching of Elang Thainesia exercises between Indonesia and Thailand and the
Elang Indopura air exercises between Singapore and Indonesia, as well as the more recent exercises of the Air Thamal series
between Thailand and Malaysia (as evident in the dispatch of six RMAF F-5E aircraft to northern Thailand during the 1987
exercises), reflected common concerns of the participants about the possibility of a spillover of the Indochina conflict into
Thailand.  This view is supported by the fact that in the event of such a contingency, provision of air support would have been
generally preferable to deployment of ground forces by the ASEAN neighbours to assist Thailand, and that the ASEAN states
shared a serious concern regarding the deployment of long-range Soviet aircraft in Vietnam.93  Similarly, as seen earlier, the
agreement between Malaysia and Indonesia to use the Natuna island as a base for joint exercises has been officially explained
as a measure to meet maritime threats from the South China Sea, especially that hypothetically posed by the escalating naval
competition between Vietnam and China.  The Malindo Jaya naval exercises between Indonesia and Malaysia also appear
to have a similar purpose.
Another crucial, though relatively understated, factor behind the increasing number of bilateral exercises concerns their
contribution as confidence-building measures in intra-ASEAN relations.  Fears regarding any compromise of national security
caused by ` territorial familiarisation' have gradually given way to recognition that bilateral ties could help eliminate lingering
mutual suspicions.  As Singapore's Chief of General Staff, Lt General Winston Choo, pointed out, bilateral exercises could
be a valuable means to ` build links with our neighbours, overcome suspicions and promote cooperation.'94  Though especially
relevant to Singapore's case, this observation can be applied to other ASEAN states as well.  Finally, bilateral exercises have
a small, though not insignificant, effect on training and operation budgets of the participating states.  Malaysia's Deputy
Defence Minister, Abang Abu Bakar, argued that Malaysia could reduce the cost of introducing sophisticated weapons by
performing the training exercise with one or two other ASEAN countries.95  A former senior Indonesian military officer
claimed that air exercises with another country could result in savings of up to 50 percent over unilateral exercises.  Thus
bilateral exercises enable the armed forces of the participating countries to gain valuable training while reducing operating
costs.96 
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Training
The functional and practical benefits of bilateral exercises are complemented by growing intra-ASEAN bilateral security
cooperation in the area of military training.  This involves two types of activity.  The first is the willingness of ASEAN
countries to make available their field training facilities to each other for training and exercise purposes.  The second is to
allow and encourage participation of students from other ASEAN countries in the military education and officer training
programmes at the national military institutions of some ASEAN countries. 
If bilateral exercises among the ASEAN countries are Indonesia-centric, cooperation on field training facilities is Singapore-
centric.  Singapore maintains two army camps in Thailand for training purposes,97  Its army training camps in Brunei have
been described by Lee Kuan Yew as the `most valuable single facility [for the SAF] which will be difficult to duplicate
elsewhere.'98  Singapore also maintains a detachment of fighter aircraft at Clark air base in the Philippines.99  Such
arrangements are not only vital to Singapore's defence capability and preparedness, given the lack of training space in the
small island state, they also serve a vital political function; like bilateral exercises they help the Republic to `remove
strangeness, promote openness and trust and build linkages' in its relations with ASEAN neighbours.100  In this respect the
opening of a 10,850 hectare joint air weapons testing range in Siabu in Sumatra in March 1989, jointly developed by
Indonesia and Singapore, is a major breakthrough, as was Indonesia's simultaneous offer to make available military training
facilities to Singapore ` almost anywhere' within its territory.  (According to press reports, a 40,000 hectare site at Batu Raja,
south of Sumatra has already been identified as a training ground for troops from Singapore.)101  The Batu Raja facility is
available to other ASEAN countries.  Other ASEAN countries have also developed military ties through provision of training
facilities.  The Thai Air Force uses the Crow Valley range in the Philippines for air weapon testing purposes;102 while
Bangkok has offered military training facilities to Brunei.103 
A similar purpose underlies the increasingly common practice among the ASEAN countries of mutual participation in each
other's officer education and training programmes.  The most important form of such interaction involves the service
command and staff colleges used to train middle and senior level officers.  Indonesia, for example, makes available all three
of its command staff colleges (Army Command and Staff College in Bandung; Navy Command and Staff College in Jakarta;
and Air Force Command and Staff College in Lembang), as well the as Special Forces Training Centre (Batu Djajar) and the
School for Police Chiefs (equivalent of service command and staff colleges, located in Lembang) to officers from other
ASEAN countries.  In addition, its National Defence Institute has periodically conducted special courses for high level ASEAN
military and civilian officials on issues such as national and regional resilience.  Singapore's highest level formal military
education programme, the SAF's six month-long Command and Staff course, regularly includes participants from other ASEAN
countries.104  The Philippines, which has until now remained somewhat peripheral to the process of bilateral military
cooperation in ASEAN, is surprisingly active in military education exchanges with its ASEAN neighbours.  According to
Defence Secretary Fidel Ramos, up to November 1989, 72 Philippine officers had been sent for training in other ASEAN
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schools, while the Philippine Command and General Staff College had trained 172 officers from Southeast Asia and Pacific,
including ASEAN.105  Thailand and Malaysia similarly have developed close and regular exchange ties with other ASEAN
states, including training at their command and staff colleges.  In 1983 (during Mahathir's visit to Brunei), Malaysia offered
Brunei `fullest cooperation in providing training in administration, military, police, education' and other areas.106  Brunei's
security ties with Singapore cover `exchanges of visits in matters relating to defence technology, personnel and logistics
management.'107  Apart from exchanges at command and staff level, ASEAN armed forces have developed ties in the area of
tactical training: Thailand sends its troops to Singapore for commando training; Malaysian troops have trained at the
Indonesian special forces training school at Batu Djajar; and Malaysia's Jungle and Combat Warfare school in Johore has
accepted trainees from other ASEAN states, including officers from Singapore.108 
Despite increasing interaction and familiarization through bilateral exercises and training, the armed forces of the ASEAN
states are nowhere near achieving meaningful integration.  Differences in doctrine and language remain a serious barrier to
further cooperation, limiting the benefits that could be derived from joint exercises and undermining the possibility of mutual
support in contingencies.  As a Philippines military official points out:
The armies of ASEAN do not have a set of standard doctrine necessary in conducting conventional war.  By and
large, the orientation of ASEAN armies, with the exception of Singapore and perhaps to a lesser degree Thailand,
is small unit operations owing to counter-insurgency scenario occurring in most ASEAN states.  Standard doctrine
is a must in order to ensure effective joint and combined arms operations.  Although bilateral or even trilateral
exercises are conducted among some ASEAN states, including joint exercises with external powers, the level of
proficiency of force employment is rather low.  This is further hampered by variances in training and in logistics
systems among the ASEAN states.109
An ASEAN Arms Industry?
An ASEAN security arrangement wedded to the long-term goal of regional self-reliance must include some degree of
cooperation in the field of procurement and production of arms.  Thus, while ASEAN states have been wary of multilateral
security cooperation in other areas such as military exercises, they have been much more receptive to the idea of joint efforts
in arms procurement and production.  Indonesia has been an early advocate of ASEAN cooperation on defence industrialization
which it viewed to be an essential response to the strategic situation arising from the US withdrawal from Indochina.110  In
1978, General Maradan Panggabean, Indonesia's Coordinating Minister for Security and General Policies, suggested the
establishment of an ASEAN arms factory along the lines of ASEAN Industrial Projects.111  The Foreign Minister of Malaysia
has suggested that joint arms production might be an ideal starting point for an `ASEAN Defence Community.'112  The Prime
Minister of Thailand, General Chatichai, has suggested that cooperation in arms production which could be transferred and
traded within the grouping could contribute to the self-reliance of ASEAN states and increase their bargaining power vis-à-vis
other suppliers.113 
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With the exception of Singapore and Indonesia, defence industrialization in ASEAN is still in its infancy,114  but the potential
for greater intra-ASEAN cooperation in weapons acquisition is not negligible.  The concept 
of an ASEAN defence industry involves a number of related areas of cooperation, including joint purchases, production,
transfer of defence-related technology, cooperation in maintenance and servicing of defence equipment and standardization
of weapons.  Understanding and cooperation in some of these areas has already been developed on a bilateral basis, although
the record is far from impressive.  Insofar as intra-ASEAN arms sales are concerned, it is noteworthy that for the two leading
ASEAN arms producers, Singapore and Indonesia, exports to other ASEAN states constitute the bulk of their total defence
equipment exports (56 percent for Indonesia, 57 percent for Singapore).115  Indonesia has made a strong bid, with some
success, to supply the products of its light aircraft industry to other ASEAN countries.  It has sold NB-105 helicopters to
Malaysia and AS-332 Super Puma multipurpose helicopters to Malaysia and Brunei (one each) with possibility of selling
more units to the former.116  Malaysia has reportedly ordered C-212 Aviocar transport aircraft from Indonesia, and, according
to Indonesia's Minister for Technology, B.J.J. Habibie, has already explored the possibility of purchasing four 35-seater CN
235 aircraft and Bell helicopters.117  Thailand has already purchased NBO-105 helicopters and C-212 transport aircraft from
Indonesia,118 and Thai Prime Minister Chatichai, during a visit to Indonesia in December 1988, stated that Thailand was
seriously considering the possibility of buying more Indonesia planes and helicopters.119  In January 1986, Indonesia lent two
locally manufactured CASA-212 turboprop transport planes to the Philippines to be used for counter-insurgency operations,
although it remains to be seen whether this gesture could Prompt Manila to purchase Indonesian aircraft, as has been indicated
by Defence Secretary Fidel Ramos on the eve of a trip to Thailand and Indonesia in May 1989 (which included visits to their
defence-related industries).120 
While Indonesia's exports within ASEAN consist almost entirely of aircraft, Singapore has found a market within ASEAN for
its naval patrol boats and Fast Attack Craft (FAC).  Singapore has sold Bataan- and Abra-class patrol craft to the Philippines
and Periwa-class, and a variety of other (18m, 25m and 14.5m) patrol craft to Brunei.  It has also exported FPB-45 FAC to
Thailand, while Brunei purchased Waspada-class FACs from Singapore.  Singapore's other exports to Thailand include
Gabriel SSMs, and according to one report some 30,000 SAR 80 assault rifles.121
But the breakthroughs in intra-ASEAN arms exports secured by the two leading ASEAN manufactures have not led to mutual
cooperation on arms production.  Joint production or mutual technological assistance and collaboration for arms production
among ASEAN members remains much more limited than intra-ASEAN arms transfers.  There are some minor exceptions.
Singapore helped Malaysia to develop its assault rifles and was involved in a ` small way' in the refurbishment of Malaysian
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A-4 Skyhawks.122  A more promising example of bilateral cooperation has involved Singapore and Thailand.  In January 1988,
the Thai cabinet approved a plan to co-produce with Singapore a range of small arms including 40mm rocket-propelled
grenade launchers and 40mm grenades and 105mm shells.  Arms and ammunition produced from this joint venture will be
available for export.123  Whether this could become a model for bilateral ventures involving other ASEAN countries remains
to be seen.  In 1983, the Deputy Defence Minister of Malaysia, Abang Abu Bakar, raised the possibility that Malaysia could
`move into' joint production with Singapore in the fields of aeronautics and small arms.  As a first step, Malaysia expressed
an interest in manufacturing the SAR-80 assault rifle made in Singapore.124  But Singapore has remained cool to the idea,
allegedly due to commercial considerations.125 
Greater intra-ASEAN arms transfers and joint production are both a requirement and consequence of standardization of
equipment.  In 1982, then Supreme Commander of Royal Thai Armed Forces, General Saiyud Kerdphol, urged ASEAN nations
to increase standardization through joint procurement from abroad as well as joint production within ASEAN.126  Apart from
being an essential prerequisite for inter-operability and mutual contingency assistance, opting for similar equipment reinforces
the rationale for joint production, and offers opportunity for savings in external procurement of weapons.  In 1984, Abang
Abu Bakar, strongly advocated joint procurement of weapons by ASEAN countries, claiming that ` such purchases will enable
us to save millions of dollars as prices will be lower than when purchases are made on an individual basis.'127  More recently,
Defence Secretary Fidel Ramos of the Philippines has indicated that Manila would look into ASEAN suppliers for its
equipment needs not only to reduce its dependence on the US, but also `because there is a possibility of common sourcing
which might be beneficial to the Philippines with regard to the production of defence supplies and materials.'128 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, some standardization of weapon systems occurred among ASEAN countries.  All ASEAN
states except Brunei acquired F-5 fighter and C-130 transport aircraft, while three (Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia)
acquired A-4 attack aircraft.  More recently, the F-16 has entered service in the air forces of Singapore, Indonesia and
Thailand.  The latter three and Malaysia introduced different versions of the Sidewinder air-to-air missile, while the Rapier
surface-to-air missile entered the inventories of Indonesia, Singapore and Brunei.  In terms of naval weapons, the Exocet anti-
ship missile was purchased by Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand (and later Singapore).  Commonality was also evident in
ground forces equipment, with the V-150 Commando armoured personnel carriers acquired by Indonesia, Malaysia,
Singapore and Thailand, while Brunei, Thailand, the Philippines and Malaysia introduced Scorpion light tanks to their
inventory. 
But the apparent standardization, evident mostly in relation to equipment acquired from the US, (the availability of US FMS
credits being a major factor influencing their acquisition, especially that of aircraft) was not, as one Malaysia defence analyst
has argued, the result of any conscious policy or design, even on a bilateral basis.129  In 1984, Malaysia and Indonesia
reportedly agreed to set up a joint consultative committee to look into the possibility of purchasing aircraft, spare parts, and
other military items,130 but little progress has been made.  Similarly, the idea of an ASEAN `war reserve contingency pool'
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proposed by General Saiyud Kerdphol of Thailand,131 which would require greater standardization of munitions than is the
case so far, has not materialized, although Thailand has since proceeded to form its own such pool with US involvement and
aid.  The lack of desire to devise a systematic scheme of standardization is further underscored by the fact that no real attempt
has been made to take advantage of whatever standardization has occurred by accident.  Opportunities for joint procurement
from external suppliers, which might have resulted in significant cost savings, have been ignored.  For example, some analysts
have pointed out that a joint procurement drive might have obtained better terms in the purchase of a multi-role fighter aircraft
by Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia, which in the end led to the first three separately acquiring the F-16A/B from
the US and Malaysia going for the Panavia Tornado from Britain.132 
Standardization creates opportunities for development of joint repair and maintenance facilities, which could also promote
intra-ASEAN collaboration on the transfer of defence related technology and arms production.  There are already a few
examples of such technological cooperation in the field of maintenance and repair, mostly involving Indonesia and Malaysia.
The Malaysian Airline System (MAS) secured a contract to repair and overhaul B-737 and F-27 components for the Indonesian
Air Force, and the Malaysian Company, Syarikat Airod, overhauled Indonesian C-130 Hercules aircraft in Subang.  Malaysia,
in return, sent its Albatross aircraft for overhaul in Surabaya.  MAS has a similar arrangement for the maintenance of Thai
Airways' B-737s.133  Thailand and Malaysia have discussed the possibility of Thai naval vessels using the RMN ship repair
facilities at Lumut.134  However, attempts to take advantage of existing commonalities in inventory, such as joint maintenance
facilities for Exocet missiles, (which is supposedly under consideration between Malaysia and Indonesia) and F-16 aircraft
(an idea mooted by General Benny Murdani in 1986) have not borne any fruit.135
Indeed ASEAN officials take a realistic a view of the prospects for joint procurement, production and standardization.  As
conceded by Abang Abu Bakar himself, `Each [ASEAN] government has its own procurement rules and decision-making
processes...[which] can cause major difficulties' with regard to standardization as well as joint procurement.136  In the context
of the Malaysian-Indonesian standardization/procurement objective, General Benny Murdani pointed to two barriers that
might apply to other ASEAN cases as well.  According to Murdani, the plan had limited feasibility because of (1) budgetary
constraints on the part of Indonesia, whose defence spending is lower compared to that of Malaysia, and (2) the different
strategic `needs' of the two armed forces.137  This points to two of the most important barriers to greater ASEAN cooperation
on joint weapons procurement: the differences in military spending levels, and differences in geography, doctrine and overall
military strategy (contrast, for example, Singapore's emphasis on forward defence with Indonesia's emphasis on `depth';
Thailand's preoccupation with land based threats from north with Malaysia's increasing concern with maritime security; and
the Philippines's turn toward counterinsurgency with the rest of ASEAN states' increasing orientation towards conventional
warfare.)138 
In the specific context of joint arms production, the problems centre around the fact that ASEAN producers are far from being
self-reliant in defence-related technologies.  As such, their interest in entering into joint ventures with external producers far
exceeds their involvement in creating an ASEAN industry.  Furthermore, old `psychological barriers' which inhibit political
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cooperation among ASEAN states, and `national chauvinism,' also affect the prospect for greater cooperation in defence
production.139  It has been suggested that fear of a leading role for Singapore in any ASEAN arms manufacturing scheme,
which would give the island republic undue leverage over its dependent neighbours, might explain the low level of intra-
ASEAN cooperation in defence production.140  But this view ignores the fact that in the past both Malaysia and Indonesia have
actively solicited Singapore's help in building their defence manufacturing capabilities.  Indeed Singapore itself is hardly a
proponent of an ASEAN arms industry which it might conceivably dominate.  Perhaps the most outright dismissal of the notion
of an ASEAN arms industry along the lines of ASEAN Industrial Projects has come from Singapore, the country which has to
play an instrumental role in any such project.  As Singapore's Trade and Industry Minister, Lee Hsien Loong, pointed out in
an interview with the Indonesia defence magazine TSM, each ASEAN country had its own approach to strategic industry and
priorities were different in relations to key areas such as military engineering, artillery and weapons system.  Given that in
the development of national defence industries in ASEAN the priorities are determined ` not [by considerations of] economics,
but security,' it is difficult to foresee an ASEAN arms industry because of the differing security needs and interest among the
members.141  
Prospects for the Future
Where do the ASEAN states go from here? As the foregoing discussion indicates, bilateral security ties have come a long way
and provide a solid foundation for trilateral and multilateral cooperation.  Already, multilateralism is evident in the field of
intelligence and security information exchanges.  And ASEAN policy-makers are no longer shying away from a public
advocacy of greater military cooperation within the regional grouping.  But do the existing forms of bilateral military
cooperation constitute a sufficient basis for moving ASEAN towards an alliance? What are the constraints on and prospects
for greater defence and security cooperation in ASEAN?  The technical and operational barriers to greater intra-ASEAN security
cooperation have been outlined in the preceding sections.  Yet, it seems plausible to argue that these operational barriers,
including the lack of standardization of equipment and differences in doctrines and language, though important, are not
insurmountable.  The armed forces of the ASEAN states can bridge the doctrinal gap and achieve greater standardization
through existing bilateral frameworks in a relatively short period of time, should their leaders muster the political will for
greater cooperation. 
The most important barriers to greater intra-ASEAN security cooperation, then, are decidedly political.  ASEAN leaders continue
to stress the advantages of keeping their defence links bilateral, and there seems to be a consensus against a military pact.
As General Sutrisno argued, `A pact is a contract and we don't want that.'142  On another occasion, he argued that `Without
a military pact...[the ASEAN states] can in fact cooperate flexibly' in the security field.143  For ASEAN states, the need to
preserve ASEAN's `non-military, non-provocative' complexion continue to outweigh the possible benefits of a military pact.
As General Fidel Ramos warned,
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[an ASEAN defence pact] ...could provoke an arms race, intensify ideology-based polarisation and conflicts within
South-east Asia, encourage the big powers to initiate preemptive counteraction and prevent ASEAN from pursuing
with undiluted vigour and freedom of action its vision of full regional stability and economic self-sufficiency.144
The prospects for an ASEAN military pact appears even more unlikely in view of developments that are bound to force the
ASEAN states to take a hard look at the priorities and objectives of their collective regional agenda.  In a period of rising
expectations at home and protectionism abroad, the issue of regional economic cooperation assumes greater significance than
before.  External economic pressures, such as European and North American integration, the potential of China and Eastern
Europe to divert Western investment from the ASEAN region, and the possibility that ASEAN regionalism could be
overshadowed by the recent moves to form an OECD-type forum for the wider Asia-Pacific region, are challenges that require
urgent collective attention from ASEAN states.  Emphasis on military matters could divert attention as well as resources from
economic goals.  Lack of concrete results in the field of economic cooperation strains ASEAN's credibility, given the fact that
the association stressed this objective at the time of its origin.  The Prime Minister of Malaysia, Mahathir Mohammed, issued
a timely reminder of ASEAN's priorities which echoes the perspective of many policy-makers and intellectuals in the region:
So far ASEAN has proved effective in the political field.  It has not been so successful in economic cooperation.
Yet now it has to face new economic challenges resulting from the modernisations of the Five Kingdoms (China,
Japan, US, USSR, and EEC) and their stress on the economic betterment of their people...Closer regional economic
cooperation within ASEAN is now imperative.145
Furthermore, there is the question whether any change to ASEAN's image and priorities might undermine its achievements
in the political field to date.  This is an especially important consideration given that ASEAN's much heralded unity over the
Cambodia conflict has been significantly strained since the advent of the Chatichai administration in Thailand.  If ASEAN
overcomes its barely-concealed differences over the Thai initiatives towards in Indochina, it might still find it difficult to keep
political cooperation alive in the absence of an unifying security threat.  As Foreign Minister Wong Kan Seng of Singapore
warned, `The continued relevance of the organisation, post Cambodia, can not be taken for granted.'146
In addition, the prospect of a reformed Vietnam in the post-Cambodia phase raises the thorny issue of its cooption into the
ASEAN fold, a move that, if seriously undertaken and brought to fruition, might fundamentally alter the character of ASEAN
as a regional grouping, and remove the possibility of it adopting any military-security arrangement.  ASEAN remains
committed, at least in theory, to a framework of regional order encompassing the entire region of Southeast Asia.  But if the
past is any guide, the question of relations with Vietnam is likely to prove highly divisive for ASEAN.  It would also absorb
a good deal of ASEAN's diplomatic attention and energy.  In this context, one may wonder whether ASEAN could make a better
contribution to regional security by working seriously towards Vietnam's eventual integration into a revised and broadened
framework for regional order rather than by forming a subregional military alliance which might infinitely complicate the
process of rapproachment with Hanoi. 
ASEAN's political challenge extends not only to the wider regional issues of Cambodia and Vietnam, but also to problems
between its member states.  Although ASEAN has made a major stride in creating an atmosphere of peace and stability in
relations among its members, it may be too early to pronounce it as a `security community,' a state of affairs in which its
members can develop `dependable expectations of peaceful change' and rule out the possibility of resort to force as a means
of problem-solving in intra-ASEAN relations.147  Although the suspicions and rivalries at the time of ASEAN's formation, such
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as those over the demarcation of land borders, perceptions of Singapore's identity and role by its Malay neighbours, and the
Philippine-Malaysia conflict over Sabah, have been considerably muted, new disputes over sovereignty and economic control
have arisen in the maritime sphere.  These disputes threaten ASEAN's solidarity and challenge its record of conflict-
management.  ASEAN confronts the task of developing an appropriate framework for regional order which could bring its
ZOPFAN concept to fruition and in which intra-ASEAN conflicts, including the potential maritime conflicts, can be peacefully
settled.  Unresolved bilateral disputes such as the Sabah issue are not only a barrier to greater military cooperation within
ASEAN, but resolving them should remain the fundamental priority of ASEAN before it seriously entertains any move towards
a military arrangement.  In other words, the achievement of a genuine `security community' assumes priority over that of a
`defence community' in ASEAN's current and prospective political agenda.
Of the major intra-ASEAN disputes that remain, the one between Malaysia and the Philippines over Sabah provides a good
example of both the possibilities and limits of intra-ASEAN conflict-management.  Although the `ASEAN spirit' led former
President Marcos to publicly drop the claim at the time of the Kuala Lumpur summit in 1977, the final resolution of the
dispute has proven to be elusive.   Attempts by the Aquino government to secure the necessary legal basis for dropping the
claim has been thwarted by the Philippine Senate.  Philippine National Security Advisor, Rafael Ileto, has warned that failure
to resolve the Sabah issue could lead to renewed Malaysian aid to the MNLF separatist guerrillas in the Mindanao region of
the Philippines, thereby further complicating the prospect for any meaningful bilateral security cooperation between Manila
and Kuala Lumpur.148  A host of other intra-ASEAN disputes have emerged, many of these in the maritime sphere.  A recent
listing of these maritime boundary disputes by an official of the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Coordinating Centre is
revealing .  According to his list, of the 15 maritime boundaries in the South China Sea (excluding the Gulf of Thailand), 12
are in dispute, two have been agreed (one partially) and one resolved through a joint exploitation agreement.  Of particular
interest is the fact that six of these boundary disputes are between ASEAN countries, with Malaysia having disputes with every
other ASEAN country.149  In April 1988, the arrest by the Malaysian Navy of 49 Philippino fishermen who allegedly intruded
into Malaysian waters caused considerable tension in bilateral relations.  Several rounds of talks since then have not resolved
the issue.150  Following the incident, the Philippines deployed additional ships and troops in the area bordering Malaysia,
although Defence Secretary Fidel Ramos said that a `military approach was uncalled for at this time' (emphasis added)151
Both Malaysia and the Philippines have stationed troops on the Spratlys atolls to support their claim on these islands, which
have also been claimed by Vietnam, Taiwan and China.  The dispute between Malaysia and Singapore over the Horsburgh
Lighthouse or Pedra Branca is also important; Singapore recently singled it out among the Republic's unresolved territorial
problems with its ASEAN neighbours.152  
Another case of bilateral tension in ASEAN is within the so-called `sub-ASEAN triangle' involving Malaysia, Singapore and
Indonesia.  A case in point is Malaysia's objection to Singapore's offer of military facilities to the US in 1989.  It was partly
coloured by the lingering suspicions concerning the Republic's military posture vis-à-vis Malaysia.  Ahmad Badawi, a former
Malaysian Defence Minister, reminded Malaysians that Singapore continued to perceive Malaysia `as a threat to [its]
existence,' and in this context, ` the [Singapore] offer...[might be] directed as a deterrence directed against us.'153  To the  extent
that mutual suspicions and tension between Malaysia and Singapore, recently acknowledged by the Chief of Malaysian
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Armed Forces,154 reflect deep-rooted historical and ethnic factors, they are not amenable to quick-fix solutions.  A number
of recent incidents reflect how racial and ethnic factors continue to thwart efforts by their leadership to improve political and
military relations.  The most serious manifestation of this was the visit by Israeli President Chaim Herzog to Singapore in
1986, which invoked widespread protest in Malaysia.  Malaysian leaders accused Singapore of being `oblivious to the
sensitivities and feelings of the Muslim communities in the region' and stressed the damage caused by the visit to ASEAN
solidarity in general and Singapore-Malaysian relations in particular.155  In perhaps the most revealing comment on the Herzog
visit, acting Foreign Minister (later Defence Minister) Tengku Rithauddeen likened Singapore's position in ASEAN to that of
`a wolf in sheep's clothing.'156  Another source of strain in bilateral relations was a remark made by Singapore's Second
Defence Minister in February 1986 underscoring the policy of not assigning sensitive positions in the Singapore Air Force
to officers of Malay ethnic background.  This was construed by the Malaysian Foreign Minister as a hint that ` Singapore could
be regarding Malaysia as an enemy' and sparked off a major public outcry in Malaysia which has yet to fade away.157
Another factor complicating security relations within the `triangle' is the uneasiness felt by Malaysia over the growing
bilateral military links between Singapore and Indonesia.  There is already a feeling in Malaysia that the growing security
ties between Indonesia and Singapore could be at the expense of Malaysian-Indonesia relations.158  Even some Indonesian
officials feel that Singapore's interest in developing close security ties with Indonesia could partly be due to its strategy of
using the latter as a counterweight to Malaysian pressure.159  Although Indonesia has moved to dismiss Kuala Lumpur's fears,
other factors have strained the hitherto close political understanding and security relationship between the two countries.  In
early 1990, a public outcry in Indonesia over Malaysia's execution of an Indonesian national convicted of drug-trafficking
prompted Defence Minister Benny Murdani to warn that the ` special relationship' between the two countries ` can not be taken
for granted.'160  The significant improvement in Singapore's ties with Indonesia as Indonesia's ties with Malaysia come under
some strain is an ASEAN irony and it creates new uncertainty over the future of their bilateral and trilateral military links.
A viable ASEAN military arrangement presupposes a capability within the grouping to provide assistance to members in time
of need. Presently, no ASEAN state, Indonesia included, can be said to have that ability.  The armed forces of ASEAN states
are still geared to national, rather than regional self-help, and even then are not deemed adequate against major external
threats.  As such, while various ASEAN countries had made public declarations of their intent to provide contingency help to
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neighbours facing a major security threat.  Such commitments have gone beyond the pledges of assistance made
to the frontline state, Thailand, by its ASEAN partners in the immediate aftermath of the Vietnamese invasion of
Cambodia.  Adam Malik, the foreign minister of Indonesia, once asserted that: `If Singapore or Malaysia is
attacked and they ask Indonesia for help, we certainly can not remain idle as we are morally bound to help
them.' Cited in Dick Wilson, The Neutralization of Southeast Asia (New York: Praeger, 1975), p. 157.  Later, in
November 1983, Benny Murdani stated that Indonesia would help Malaysia in the event of an attack on the
latter because `If Malaysia is attacked, Indonesia would also feel the pinch' (New Straits Times, 16 November
1983.) In 1981, Lee Kuan Yew declared that `Singapore's armed forces should be prepared to augment
Malaysia's armed forces to meet any threat of external aggression' (Straits Times, 19 December 1981). The
pledge was restated by deputy Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong, who stated that Malaysia and Singapore would
help each other if either country was attacked (New Straits Times, 9 September 1988).
Malaysia's Home Affairs Minister, Mohammed Ghazalie Shafie, stated in 1979 that `Any threat to either of us
[Malaysia or Indonesia] will be regarded as a threat to both our countries.  We will jointly act to fight these
threats to the very end.' (Cited in Ho Kwon Ping and Cheah Cheng Hye, `Five Fingers on the Trigger,' Far
Eastern Economic Review, 24 October 1980, p. 34.) In the wake of the 1984 border agreement between
Malaysia and Indonesia, the Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister, Musa Hitam, revealed that Indonesia-Malaysia
defence cooperation included `a contingency plan [that would be put into effect] in case something happens.'
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fellow ASEAN states,161 such intra-ASEAN security commitments are hardly credible.  The limitations of an ASEAN deterrent
have been stressed by the Chief of Staff of Malaysian Defence Forces
In terms of deterrence value, it is very doubtful if an ASEAN alliance would really deter any would be aggressor for
the fact that the combined military power of ASEAN is not even able to match the Vietnamese military might (just
to quote an example).  To achieve deterrence ASEAN will have to form an alliance with one of the superpowers.
Doing this would mean attracting competition from the other superpower apart from violating the ZOPFAN
concept.162
In reality no ASEAN country sees intra-ASEAN security cooperation as a substitute for its strategic partnership with external
powers.  This is evident from the continuing value placed on the US military presence in the region by all the ASEAN countries,
whether publicly or privately - notwithstanding the recent controversy over Singapore's offer of military facilities to the US.
In fact, Indonesia's attempt to diffuse the situation arising out of Malaysian protests against Singapore's offer, and the
Malaysian leadership's, (as opposed to certain sections within its grassroots polity) eventual willingness to accommodate
Singapore's position, are indications that both of the key champions of the ZOPFAN ideal regard the US regional presence to
be a key factor in ASEAN's security.  The continuing relevance, in fact limited reinvigoration, of the Five Power Defence
Arrangements, further testifies to the strong external component of the security options of the ASEAN states. 
But the constraints on an ASEAN military alliance do not preclude the development of closer and more diversified forms of
bilateral military-security cooperation among its members.  The current fluidity of the external strategic environment of the
ASEAN states is likely to enhance bilateral military links within ASEAN.  Of the major developments in regional security, the
uncertainty over the US presence in the Philippines looms as a major concern of ASEAN policy makers.  Sections within the
ASEAN elite already fear that the loss of these bases would not only constrain the US ability to respond to a regional
contingency, but also create a potential `vacuum' which might be filled by powers considered either hostile by some ASEAN
states (such as the Soviet Union and China, although the perception of Moscow as a `hostile' power has changed in recent
years) or politically unacceptable to them as a security partner (such as Japan).  The possibility of a ` security gap' in the South
China Sea resulting from the US withdrawal, and more generally the threats from the maritime environment in Southeast Asia,
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provide a backdrop to the need for greater defence and security cooperation voiced by some ASEAN leaders and analysts.163
Various ASEAN leaders, most notably Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore, have expressed a sense of unease and
apprehension over the growing military, especially naval, prowess and profile of India, China and Japan, three powers which
can be expected to significantly increase their role in regional security.164  India's growing naval prowess, Japan's expanding
Maritime Self-Defence Forces, and the dangers of a confrontation in the South China Sea involving Chinese, Vietnamese and
ASEAN forces are bound to figure prominently in ASEAN's perspective on regional security.  Thus, just as land based border
insurgencies provided the initial catalyst for the emergence of security arrangements among the ASEAN states, problems in
the maritime sphere could well prove to be the impetus for an ASEAN security framework of the future, incorporating, but
going beyond, the existing bilateral arrangements. 
But the emergence of a major external threat serious enough to press the ASEAN states into a defence pact is extremely
unlikely.  Even though individual ASEAN states are worried about what roles China, India and Japan might play in the region,
their perceptions are not likely to converge.  While ASEAN's political unity over the Cambodia conflict has always suffered
from differing perceptions of the Vietnamese threat (and Soviet, because of its alliance with Vietnam) the emerging strategic
divergence within ASEAN is likely to revolve more around the role of China.  Intra-ASEAN differences over the perception
of China has been highlighted over the Sino-Thai strategic relationship driven by Thai acceptance of Chinese security
guarantees against Vietnam.  Chinese arms sales to Thailand are a matter of concern in Malaysia and Indonesia, even though
the latter is moving to restore diplomatic relations with Beijing.  To the extent that suspicion of China in Malaysia and
Indonesia derives from deep-rooted domestic ethnic factors and China's record of subversion, these are unlikely to give way
to endorsement of Thailand's currently more benign view of China. 
In the final analysis, it is unlikely that any intra-ASEAN security arrangements geared to cope with the changing regional
strategic context would take the form of a multilateral pact.  ASEAN states have thus far viewed their bilateral arrangements
as an appropriate and adequate response to the kind of security threats they have faced in the past and are likely to face in
the future.  Differing threat perceptions, lingering intra-ASEAN disputes and the limited deterrent value of any ASEAN pact
are likely to weigh heavily in the minds of ASEAN policy-makers in deciding the future course of intra-ASEAN military
collaboration.  The coming years will undoubtedly see a continuing emphasis on bilateral cooperation.  If there is to be an
ASEAN ` defence community,' it is not likely to be structured around formal or multilateral military linkages within the existing
ASEAN framework, but based on closer and more diversified forms bilateral security ties constituting what the Indonesian
armed forces commander has aptly described as an ASEAN `defence spider web.'
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 Notes
1 This list excludes exercises conducted under the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) and Search and Rescue exercises.
Malaysia and Singapore hold twice-yearly bilateral air defence exercises, called Adex, as part of the Integrated Air Defence
System under the auspices of the FPDA. Search and Rescue exercises are conducted regularly between Indonesia and Malaysia,
and Malaysia and Singapore.
2 Kekar Malindo is organized by the General Border Committee. Although it began as a Command Post exercise, the 1988
exercise involved the deployment of 1,064 troops and RMAF Skyhawak aircraft `recapturing enemy occupied areas.' The
objective of the exercise goes beyond training in counterinsurgency warfare. For example, the goal of Kekar Malindo VII was
described by Malaysia as training in `conventional warfare, especially defence and counterattack' (New Straits Times, 17
November 1983; Star 17 August 1988). Indonesia and Malaysia have also carried out army exercises of the Tatar Malindo
and Kripura Malindo series. Kripura Malindo I, a command post exercise, was held in Semantan, Sarawak, in February 1981
(New Straits Times, 21 February 1981). Tatar Malindo, a field training exercise held in Sabah/ East Kalimantan, to train
troops in `conventional warfare tactics,' was first conducted in January 1981 (Donald Weatherbee, `ASEAN Security
Cooperation and the South China Sea,' Paper presented to the Pacific Forum Symposium `National Threat Perceptions in
East/Asia Pacific,' Waikoloa, Hawaii, 6-8 February 1982; New Straits Times, 30 August 1983; Star, 20 August 1983). A total
of 17 army exercises were held between 1977 and 1987 (Personal interviews in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 16 August 1989).
3 This is the name of the first exercise held in Singapore in May 1989. The two countries also held an army exercise in Sarawak
in the following October (Star, 26 May 1989; Sunday Times [Singapore], 21 May 1989; Pioneer, No. 141, July 1989).
4 Organized by the Regional Border Committee for close support missions against CPM insurgents, Air Thamal I field exercise
held in March 1982 was preceded by a commnad post exercise in October 1979. Thailand and Malaysia are planning new air
defence exercises (B.A. Hamzah, ` ASEAN Military Cooperation Without Pact or Threat,' Asia Pacific Community, No. 22,
Fall 1983, pp. 42-43; Straits Times, 3 August 1989).
5 Organized by the regular navies of the two countries, Thalay was first held in August 1980 at the Woodlands base. It was
preceded by exercises of the Sea Ex-Thamal series launched in 1979 between the marine police of the two countries within
the framework of their Regional Border Committee (Hamzah, op. cit., pp. 42-43; New Straits Times, 21 August 1980).
6 Apart from Hornbill, the two sides have held other naval exercises since 1981 (Personal interviews in Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia, 16 August 1989; K.U. Menon, ` A Six Power Defence Arrangement in Southeast Asia,' Contemporary Southeast
Asia, Vol.10, No.3, December 1988, p. 314).
7 A naval exercise between Indonesia and Thailand in Gulf of Thailand was reported in January 1975, The Straits Times 28
January 1975. In the early 1980s, the Sea Garuda exercises appear to have been held annually. For example, Sea Garuda 4B-
83 was held in August 1983, and the exercise was again held the following year.
8 Asian Defence Journal, No.5, 1976, p. 26.
9 According to official Malaysian sources, Indonesia and Malaysia had conducted 12 Malindo Jaya naval exercises between
1972 and 1983, thereby indicating that the exercises began in 1973 (New Straits Times, 9 May 1984).
10 Command Post exercises involving officers from all three services, no warships or aircraft used (Star, 18 November 1982);
Darsasa 2 was held in November 1986 (Star, 20 Novemebr 1986). Recently, the two countries have announced plans to hold
their first combined field training exercise in 1991 (Indonesia Observer, 10 August 1989).
11 The Straits Times, 16 December 1989.
12 Pioneer, No.82, August 1984.
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13 Pioneer, No.109, November 1986.
14 Bangkok Post, 7 January 1982.
15 The Philindo naval exercises most likely began in early 1970s. Philindo II was held in 1973, followed by Philindo III in 1975
(China News, 4 November 1975; The Straits Times, 13 June 1973). These appear to have been replaced by annual patrol
exercises Corpatphilindo or Coordinate Patrol, Philippines-Indonesia (Personal Interview with the Defence Attache of the
Philippines, Jakarta, 10 August 1989).
16 Pioneer, No.84, October 1984.
17 These exercises were initially reported to be an annual event, as indicated in the SAF publication, Pioneer (No.74, May 1984).
However, a later issue of Pioneer (No. 129, July 1988) stated that Sing-Siam was a biennial exercise.
18 The Straits Times, 18 August 1983; Pioneer, No.72, October 1983.
19 Pioneer, No.120, October 1987.
20 Ex-Lancer is an annual exercise while Ex Singa-Hutan was held in 1984. The latter was the first brigade level exercise of
the Royal Brunei Armed Forces, in which a battalion of SAF soldiers and A-4 Skyhawk aircraft participated (Asian Defence
Journal, January 1988, p. 18).
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Indonesia /
Malaysia
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Malaysia /
Singapore
Malaysia / 
Thailand
 
Malaysia /
Thailand
Malaysia /
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Singapore /
Thailand
Singapore /
Thailand
Singapore /
Brunei
Singapore /
Brunei
Army
Air
Navy
All
Services
Army
Air
Navy
Air
Navy
Navy
Army
Navy
Air
 
Navy
Navy 
Air
Navy
Navy
Army
Kekar Malindo /
Tatar Malindo /
Kripura Malindo2
Elang Malindo
Malindo Jaya
Darsasa Malindo
Safakar Indopura
Elang Indopura
Englek
Elang Thainesia
Sea Garuda
Philindo
Semangat Bersatu3
Malapura
Air Thamal4
Thalay5
Hornbill6
(and others)
Sing-Siam
Thai-Sing
Pelican
Ex Lancer /
(Ex Singa-Hutan)
1977
1981
1981
1975
1973
1982 
1989
1980
1975
1981
1975 (?)7
1972
1989
1984
1981
1980
1981 (?)
1981
1983
1979
(?)
Annual
Intermittent (?)
Intermittent (?)
Annual8
Annual (?)9
Twice since 
1982 (?)10
Annual11
Annual12
Annual13
Annual14
Intermittent (?)
Irregular15
Annual
Annual15
Annual
Intermittent (?)
(?)
(?)17
Annual18
Annual19
Annual20
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